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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
PRESTON ALLEN, suing for himself
and other American Indians similarly
situated,
Plaintiff,
-vs.-

Case No. 8589

PORTER L. MERRELL, individually
and as County Clerk, Duchesne
County, Utah,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

Preliminary Statement

This is a test suit by an An1erican Indian residing
on an Indian reservation in lTtah, suing for himself
and other American Indians siinilarly situated, to det·e·rmine whether the action of a state election official in
denying plaintiff .a right to vote be·cause of his residence
on an Indian reservation is contrary to the Constitution
and laws of the United States and the laws of the State
of Utah. Also involved is the validity of so much of par.
11, Section 20-2-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as disqualifies from voting Indians who reside on. Indian
reservations and have never acquired residence in a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

county in Utah prior to taking up their residence on such
reservation. Because of the importance of this question
to the more than 3,783 American Indians residing in
Utah and in an effort to obtain an authoritative ruling
in advance of the last registration day prior to the general and Presidential election of November 5, 1956, the
original jurisdiction of this court has been invoked. At
the present time L"tah is the only state in the United
States which denies Indians a right to vote. This case
presents the basic question of whether this most singular
discrimination is contrary· to the Constitution and laws
of the United States and the laws of Utah. Its importance transcends the borders of the State of Utah, because presumably, if under the Constitution and laws of
the United States, Utah can exclude Indians residing
on reservations from voting, other states could, impose
sin1ilar restrictions upon the more than 400,000 Indians
in the United States.
Statement of Facts

Plaintiff is an American Indian born in Utah on
Dece1nber 21, 1913, being over tw·enty-one years of age. 1
He re~ides at Altonah, Duchesne County, Ftah, on assigned tribal land, title to which is held by the United
States in trust for the ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation. A.t all tin1es 1naterial to this
suit plaintiff has resided in Utah and has resided in
1
Since this is an original action before the court on a motion
to dismiss and not to make permanent the alternative writ, the
facts alleged in the petition must be taken as admitted. There
is no dispute as to the essential facts.

2
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Duchesne County for mor& than four months and in the
election precinct in which he is registered for more than
sixty days. He is a regis,tered voter in Duchesne County,
Utah, and except for par. 11, Section 20-2-14, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, the validity of which is drawn in question in this suit and is alleged to interfere, under applicable Utah laws, he is qualified to vote. In the last
general election in Utah plaintiff was qualified and did
vote.
Plaintiff resides within the area embraced within
the Uintah Indian Reservation established by the Executive Order of the President dated October 3, 1861, and set
aside by the Act of May 5, 1864, 13 Stat. 63, as a Re,servation for the Indians of Utah. Pursuant to the Act of
June 4, 1898, 30 Stat. 429 and the Act of May 27, 1902,
32 Stat. 245, 263, certain of said Reservation lands were
allotted in severalty ~to individual Indians and the balance
thereof was opened to entry and settlement under the
public land laws and much of it has been disposed of by
fee patents and other conveyances to non-Indians. Certain undispos,ed of portions have been restored to tribal
use and ownership.
In 1897 the u~,tah Legislature adopted a statute,
which has remained unchanged by legislative action and
is now par. 11, Section 20-2-14, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, and provides with respect to registration and
voting:
" (11) Any person living upon any Indian
or military reservation shall not be deemed a
resident of Utah within the meaning of this chap3'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ter, unless such person had acquired a residence
in some county in Utah prior to taking up his
residence upon such Indian or military reservation."2
This statutory provision has been the subject of
opinions by the Attorney General of Utah. In 1940 the
then Attorney General ruled that it did not apply to reservations which had been opened for entry under the
public land laws, such as the Uintah Reservation, and
that Indians on that reservation were to be permitted
to vote. 3 lt was under this construction that plaintiff
has heretofore been allowed to vote.
Subsequently, on :March 23, 1956, the present Attorney General of Urtah ruled in an opinion to the Secretary
of State, who had inquired as to who has the responsibility of providing voting facilities for Indians, that" ...
Indians who live on the reservations are not entitled to
vote in l 1 tah and a Board of County Commissioners has
no duty to provide them with voting facilities." 4
On September 8, 1956 plaintiff presented himself 3Jt
the office of defendant, the County Clerk of Duchesne
County, U~tah, who under Sections 20-6-3 to 20-6-9 has
responsibilities as an election official of the State of
Utah to issue .and recei,Te absentee ballots. Plaintiff
2 Initially adopted in Laws of 1897, Chapter L, Section 11. This
exact language accompanied by a proviso was enacted in 1896,
Laws of Utah, 1896, Chapter ·CXXVI, pp. 383-4, but the proviso was dropped in 1897.

3

The full text is Appendix A hereto.

' This opinion is set forth in full in Appendix B he1·eto.

4
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asserl1ed to defendant that he would be absent fron1 the
precinct and county on election day, September 11, 1956,
and reque.sted that he be issued a ballot and allowed to
cast an absentee ballot in the Septe1nber 11, 1956 primary
election, which would select nominees or candidates for
United Strutes Senator, Representative in Congress, Governor of Utah and other state and local office•s. Defendant refused to issue plaintiff an .abs,entee ballot for the
sole reason which he then stated in writing, as follows:
"Under authority of Sec. 20-2-14, Paragraph
11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, I, Porter L.
:Merrell, Duchesne County Clerk, do hereby refuse
to give a Ballot to Preston Allen of Altonah, Utah,
bec.ause he has stated to me that he lives on an
Indian Reservrution and did not es·tablish a residence in any other precinct in the State of Utah
prior to this time .... ~'
Defendant has advised plaintiff and others similarly
situated that bec.ause of par. 11, Section 20-2-14, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, he in the future would not is,sue a
ballot to any Indian residing on an Indian reservation
unless the Indian applicant had established a residence
in some county in Utah prior to establishing .a residence
on the Indian reservation.
Plaintiff brings this action to challenge defendant's
action and seeks :
(1) A mandatory order of this court directing defendant as County Clerk of Duchesne County and all
election officials of the State of Ut.ah and Duchesne
County acting under his direction and control to refrain

5
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and desist from enforcing or applying Section 20-2-14,
Utah Code Annartated, 1953, so as to deny plaintiff and
other American Indians similarly situated, or any of
them, the right to vote in any elections of the State of
Utah, the County of Duchesne, or the community in which
they reside for the sole reason that they, or any of them,
are American Indians, reside on an Indian reservation
or have never resided elsewhere in the State of Utah
than on an Indian reservation; and
(2) An order declaring that no Indian citizen shall
be denied a right to register and vote, or either of them,
by reason of his being an Indian, residing on an Indian
reservation or never having resided elsewhere in the
State of Utah than on an Indian reservation; or
(3) In the event that this court is of the opinion
that Section 20-2-14 is properly interpreted and valid,
as applied by defendant to Indians residing on Indian
reservations in Utah, then this court is requested to issue
an injunction or n1andatory order restraining defendant
from allowing any white person residing on non-Indian
land within the former Uintah Indian Reservation from
voting as a resident of Utah.
Points Upon Which Plaj.ntiff Relies

I. Indians Residing on Reservations in Utah, Like
All Other A1nerican Indians, Are Citizens of the United
States and the State in 'Yhieh They Reside and Are
J~ntitled to All Privileges .and Inununities of Su~h
Citizenship.
6
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II. The Denial of Voting Privileges to Indians Residing on Indian Re~servations in Utah on the Sole
Ground That They Have Not Resided Elsewhere in the
State and For No Re~ason Connected With Capacity or
Qualification to Vo~te Constitutes Discrimina,tion Between
Indians ,and Non-Indians on Account of Race or Color
and is Prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment.
III. The Exclusion of Persons Residing on Indian
ReS'ervations, Except Those \Vho Prior to Establishing
Such Residence Have Established a Residence Els~ewhere
in the State of Utah, From the Classification of Residents
for Voting Purposes Constitutes Unreasonable and Discriminatory Classification Precluded by the Privileges
and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. If Par. 11, Section 20-2-14 is Valid as Applied
to Deny Indians Residing Within the Former Uintah
Reservation the Right to Votre, Equal Protection and
Application of the Law Requires that White Persons
Residing Within the Former Reservation Also he Excluded from Voting.
V. This Court Has Authority to Issue An Injunction or Other Equitabl~e Relief to Protect Plaintiff's
Political Rights Guaranteed by The Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.
ARGUMENT
I. Indians Residing on Reservations in Utah, Like All
Other Amerian Indians, Are Citizens of the United States

7
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and the State in Which They Reside and Are Entitled to
All Privileges and Immunities of Such Citizenship.

Since June 2, 1924, when Congress passed the Indian
Citizenship Act ( 43 Srtat. 253) all Indians born within
the territorial limits of the United States have been citizens by virtue of that act. 5 The Nationality Act of 1940
(54 Stat. 1137, 1138) eliminated any doubt as to the
status of Indians born after the 1924 act6 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat.
163, 8 U.S.C., Sec. 1401 codifies the previous legislation
as follows:
"(2) a person born in the United States rto
a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other
aboriginal tribe: Provided, That the granting of
citizenship under this subsection shall not in any
manner impair or othernise affect the right of
such person to tribal or other property;" (p. 122)
By virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, Indians residing in Utah
are citizens of that state. Section 1 of that amendment
provides:

~.

5 This act naturalized 125,000 native-born Indians, Cohen's
Handbook on Federal Indian Law, p. 153.
6 In Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. (2d) 456, (1948)
the court stated:
"The Congress on June 2. 1924, 43 Stat. 253, declared all
Indians to be citizens of the United States, 8 U.S.C.A. § 3, and
then just prior to World "'ar II, on October 14, 1940, enacted
the :Nationality Act of 1940,' U.S.C.A., Title 8, section 601, so
as to clear up any doubt . created by the language of the Act
of 1924 as to the status of Indians born after the effective date
of the prior Act." (p. 459)
See also Totus v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 7 (D.C. Wash.,
1941).

8
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1,

"All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the St1ate
wherein they reside."
In Deere v. State of New York, 22 F. 2d 851 (N.D.
N.Y., 1927) the court stated in .addressing itself to a
question- of diversity of citizenship:
"An Indian, becoming a citizen or" the U nived
States and residing in a state, is held to be a citizen of that state. Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135162, ... " (p. 852)
Nor can there any longer be a question that Indians
residing on Indian reservations in Utah are residing in
the State of Utah and citizens thereof. 7 This que~stion
was settled in United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621,
where the Supreme Court held that the Ute Reservation
in Colorado was within that state. 8 As lwte as 1946 the
Supreme Court in New York Ex Rel. Ray v. Mart in, 326
U.S. 496 (1946) in following the 11-'fcBratney case, in .a
case involving an Indian reservation in New York, stated
with reference to the McBratney ease:
"The holding in that case was that the Aet
of Congress admitting Colorado into the Union
overruled all prior inconsistent statutes and treaties and placed it 'upon an equal footing with the
original Strutes . . .'; that this meant that Colorado had 'criminal jurisdiction over its own citi-

-----

7
This is impliedly admitted in the ruling of the present Attorney General, Appendix B, par. 1.
8
This opinion of the highest court in the land cannot be reconciled with par. 11, Sec. 20-2-14 or the opinion of the Attorney
General. See Oohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, p. 158
to this effect.

9
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zens and other white persons throughout the whole
of the territory within its limits, including the
Ute Reservation'; and that consequently, the
United States no longer had 'sole and exclusive
jurisdiction' over the Reservation, except to the
e:x!tent necessary to carry out such treaty provisions which remained in force. That case has since
been followed by this Court and its holding has not
been modified by any act of Congress." (pp. 497498)
Also, in Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, the
Supreme Court had under consideration the Enabling
Act of the State of :\Iontana and concluded that an Indian reservation is geographically, politically and governmentally within the boundaries of the state wherein it
is located, unless Congress upon admission of the state
into the Union, has expressly excepted such reservation.
In Porter v. Hall, 3± Ariz. 308, 271 Pae. 411 (1928)
the Supreme Court of Arizona was considering an original action in that court, similar to the present action in
this court, by an Indian seeking to establish his right
to vote and to obtain a "Tit of 1nandamus against the
county recorder to require hin1 to allow plaintiff to vote.
One of the defenses was that " . . . the reservation in
question, though geographically in Arizona, is politically
and govermnentally without it, since it is not subject to
the full jurisdietion of our [Arizona ·s] laws.·· The Suprerne Court c:arefull~- analyzed the Arizona Enabling
Act, which is in all respects emnpa.rable to that of Utah,
and held:
"We have no hesitancy in holding, therefore,
that all Indi3Jl reservllltions in Arizona are within

_

10
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1l

,.

the political and governmental, as well as geographical, boundaries of the state, and that the
exception set forth in our Enabling Act applies
to the Indian lands considered as property, and
not as a territorial area withdrawn from the
sovereignty of the state of Arizona. Plaintiffs,
therefore, under the stipulation of facts, are resi<lents of the state of Arizona, within the meaning
of section 2, articie 7, supra." (p. 415)

Subsequently the Supreme Court of Arizona in
Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. (2d) 456 followed
its conclusion in Porter v. Hall, sttpra, as to Indians
residing on Indian reservations in Arizona being residents of Arizona and .held that the Arizona constitution
excluding persons under guardianship from suffrage did
not extend to Indians living on reserv;ations, who were
entitled to vote.
In another leading case in Indian Affairs, the DistricJt Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate District of
California, in considering a contention by a county that
"reservation Indians are not residents of the county for
the purpose of obtaining direct county relief under the
code sections involved" made an extensive analysis of
the legal and factual factors applicable and held in Acosta
v. San Diego County, 126 Cal. App. 2d 455, 272 P. 2d 92,
96, 99 (1954):
"The decisions hold thak the United States
does not have ~exclusive jurisdiction over Indian
reservations in all respects. On the contr:ary, the
state's jurisdiction extends to all matters which do
no't interfere with the control which the f·ederal
government has exercised over Indian affairs.
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The principle that Indian reservations are geographically, politically and governmentally within
the boundaries of the state wherein they are located, unle!ss Congress, upon admission of the
State into the union, or otherwise, has by express
words excepted such areas from that jurisdiction,
was laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States in United States v. McBr.atney, 104 U.S.
621, 26 L. Ed. 869 .... In the absence of such limiting treaty provisions, tribal lands within the state
are part of the state and subject to its jurisdiction in many respects, regardless of whether or
not the Indians themselves may be exempt from
certain .aspects of that jurisdiction. Langford v.
Monteith, 102 U.S. 145, 26 L. Ed. 53.

• • •
"The decree holding that plaintiff is a resident of the County of San Diego, State of California, and that she is not disqualified from receiving the benefits provided for by section 2500
of the Welfare and Institution Code by reason
of the fact that she resides on an Indian reservation situated within the boundaries of this county
must be sustained." (pp. 96-99)
Other evidence of this eonclusion which has been
considered by the courts includes the long history of
federal legislation bearing on the issue. The states have
been authorized by federal statute to enter upon Indian
lands for the purpose of 1naking inspection of health and
educational ronditions and enforcing sanitation and
quarantine regulations, or for the purpose of enforcement of rompulsory sc.hool aHendanee b~- Indian pupils.
( 45 Stat. 1185; 60 Stat. 962; 25 U.S.C. ser. 231.) Under
the FedeTal Highway Act ( 42 Stat. 212) Indian lands
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in Utah are deemed as n1uch a part of the area of the
state as other privrute lands. Indian lands within the
st~ate are counted, .along with public land, as a basis for
additional federal road contributions. Rese·rvation Indians are counted in the federal census as residents of
Utah and are included in the popu1a:tion figures which
are used no1t only for determining representation in Congress, but also .as a basis for the allocation of positions
in the federal civil service and as a basis for various contributions of the federal government to the edueation
and welfare of the state. (Smith-Hughes Act of February 23, 1917, 39 Stat. 929, George-Harden Vocational
Act of August 1, 1946, 60 Stat. 775; N:a;tional School
Lunch Act of June 4, 1946, 60 Stat. 230). States have
been authorized to condemn restrict~ed Indian lands in
accordance with state laws. (See. 3, Act of Mar. 3, 1901,
31 Stat. 1058-84; 25 U.S.C. Sec. 357.
The statement by the court in Acosta v. San Diego
Co~mty, 126 Cal. App. 2d, 455, 272 P. 2d 92, 97 is ·equally
applicable to Utah :
"No Indian reservation in San Diego County
is self-sufficient, and no resident of any such
reservation can help traveling beyond its borders,
nor can he escape ordinary state cigare-tte, gasoline, sales or use taxes. Reservation Indians who
purchase or possess unrestricted property outside
the re~servation enjoy no more advantageous a tax
status than their white fellow citizens." (p. 97)
It having been shown that Indians living on reservations in Utah are citizens and residents of that st~ate, it
must, therefore, follow that under Section 1, Amendment
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XIV of the Constitution of the ·united States, they are
endowed with the rights, privileges and irrununities equal
to those enjoyed by all other citizens and residents of the
state. Oyama v. State of California, 332 U.S. 633, (1948);
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410,
(1948); Acosta v. San Diego County, supra, p. 98.
II. The Denial of Voting Privileges to Indians Residing
on Indian Reservations in Utah on the Sole Ground That
They Have Not Resided Elsewhere in the State and For
No Reason Connected With Capacity or Qualification to
Vote Constitutes Discrimination Between Indians and NonIndians on Account of Race or Color and is Prohibited
by the Fifteenth Amendment.

The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
·united States provides:
"Section 1. The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude."
Denial of the right of suffrage to .an Indian because
he is an Indian is prohibited by· this runendment. Also
prohibited is the denial of suffrage to Indians of a particular rla.ss when other persons of the san1e class but
of other race's are pennitted to yote. The denial of the
fr:anrhise to illiterate Indians is unconstitutional, if
white or black illitPrates are to Yote. Illiterates as a class
may be prohibited frmn voting, but racial distinction
within a class is repugnant to the Fifteenth Amendinent.
Conceivable classifications could be arrived .at which if
applied to Indians living on reservations and all other
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citizens as a class would lawfully eliminate reservation
Indians from voting, but mere residence in a cert.ain portion of the state of Utah as distinguished from another
portion of the state is not such a lawful classification.
It bears no relation to qualifieations to vote. Section
20-2-14 ean have only one possible purpose or effect,
namely, to exclude Indians residing on Indian reservations
from voting. Stripped of all verbiage and sophistication
this is purely and simply a classifieation and denial based
upon raee or color.. The decided cases demonstrate that
denial of suffrage to Indians because they are Indians
and the allowance of suffrage to part of a class and not to
the balance of the same class is prohibited. In 1871 the
Unit,ed States District Court for Oregon stated with respe~ct to the Fifteenth An1end1nent :
" ... an Indian ... who is a citizen of the
United States is entitled to vote, or rather he cannot be excluded frorn this privilege on the ground
of being an Indian, as that would be to exclude
him on account of race." McKay v. Campbell, 16
Fed. Cas. 161 (1871).
A few years later the Supreme Court of the United
States in United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 stated:
"The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer
the right of suffrage upon any one. It prevents
the States, or the United States, however, from
giving preference, in this particular, to one citizen of the United States over another on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Before its adoption, this could be done. It was
as much within the power of a State to exclude
citizens of the "United States from voting on ac-

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,
l

count of race, etc., as it was on account of age,
property, or education. Now it is not. If citizens
of one race having e;ertain qualifications are permitted by law to vote, those of another having
the same qualifications must be. Previous to this
amendment, there was no constitutional guaranty
against this discrimination: now there is." (pp.
217-218)
In Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 the Supreme Court
in ruling that a provision of the Delaware Constitution
restricting the right of suffrage to the white race was
invalid and had been enlarged by the self-executing effect
of the Fifteenth Amendment, made the following statement which is particularly applicable to Section 20-2-14,
which like the Delaware Constitutional provision, may
have been valid when adopted but became invalid with
the change of conditions and supreme law:
"Beyond question the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment had the effect, in law, to remoV1e from the State Constitution, or render inoperative, that provision which restricts the right
of suffrage to the white race. Thenceforward, the
statute which prescribed the qualifications of
jurors was, itself, enlarged in its operation, so as
to embrace all who by the State Constitution, as
modified by the supreme law of the land, were
qualified to vote at a general election. The presumption should be indulged, in the first instance,
that the State recognizes, as is its plain duty, an
amendn1ent of the Federal Constitution, from
the time of its adoption, as binding on all of its
citizens and every departlnent of its government,
and to be enforced, within its linlits, without
reference to any inconsistent provisions in its
own Constitution or statutes." (pp. 389-390)
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In Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) the
Supreme Court struck down the so-called "grandfather
clause" of the Oklahoma Constitution pointing out that
the self-executing provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment
eliminate any repugnant provisions in st:ate law:
"(c) While in the true sense, therefore, the
Amendment gives no right of suffrage, it was long
ago recognized that in operation its prohibition
might measurably have that effect; that is to say,
that as the command of the Amendmentwas selfexecuting .and reached without legislative action
the conditions _of discrimination against which
it was aimed, the result might ~arise that as a
consequence of the_ striking down of a discriminating clause a right of suffrage would be enjoyed by
reason of the· generic' 'char.acter of the provision
which· would remain .after the discrimination was
stricken out. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651;
·Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370. A familiar illustration of this doctrine re,sulted from the effect of
the adoption of the Amendment on state constitutions in which at the time of the adoption of the
Amendment the right of suffrage was conferred
on all white male citizens, since by the i:riherent
power of the Amendment the word whit·e dis.appeanid and .therefore all male citizens without
discrimination ·on account of race, color- or previous condition of· servitude came under the generic grant·. of suffrage made by the State." (pp.
362-363)
In Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) the
"grandfather clause" in Maryland was also declared invaiid as a discrimination based on race. '
Furthermore, it cannot be contended that s.pecific
words dealing with classification in terms of race or color
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must be found in the invalid statute for the Fifteenth
Amendment to apply. The Supreme Court has made
clear that where the practical effect and thrust of the
statute is to accomplish a discrimination on the basis of
race or color it is invalid. In Guinn v. United States,
supra, the Court disposed of such a contention as follows:
"We have difficulty in finding words to more
clearly demonstrate the conviction we entertain
that this standard has the characteristics which
the Government attributes to it than does the mere
statement of the text. It is true it contains no
express words of an exclusion from the standard
which it establishes of any person on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude
prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment, but the
standard itself inherently brings that result into
existence since it is based purely upon a period
of time before the enactment of the Fift~enth
A1nendment and n1akes that period the controlling
and dominant test of the right of suffr.age. In
other words, \ve seek in vain for any ground which
would sustain any other interpretation but that
the provision, recurring to the conditions existing
before the :E,ifteenth Amendment was adopted and
the continuance of which the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited, proposed by in substance and
effect lifting those conditions over to a period of
time after the Amendn1ent to make them the basis
of the right to suffrage c.onferred in direct and
positive disregard of the Fifteenth An1endJ.nent."
( pp. 364-365)
Ag<ain, in LanC' v. TVilson, 307 lT.S. ~68 (1939) the
Court in eonsidering a suit for drunages under the civil
right~ aet (8 r.R.C . ..t-3) by a negro deprived of a right
to vote on tlre ha~is of another .. grandfather clause" in
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a revised Oklahoma Constitution pointed out that the
Fifteenth An1endment extended to sophisticated as well
as simple-minded discrimination:
"We therefore cannot avoid passing on the
merits of plaintiff's constitutional claims. The
reach of the Fifteenth Amendment against contrivances by a state to thwart equality in the enjoyment of the right to vote by citizens of the United
States regardless of race or color, has been mnply
expounded by prior decisions. Guinn v. United
States, 238 U.S. 347; 11yers v. Anderson, 238 U.S.
368. The Amendment nullifies sophisticated ,as
well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.
It hits onerous procedural requirements which
effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by
the colored r.ace although the abstract right to
vote may remain unrestricted as to race." (p. 275)
It is also cle·arly established that the sanction of the
Fifteenth Amendment extends to primary eleetions, such
as the one involved in the denial of plaintiff's right to
vote, as well as to general elections. In Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) the Supreme Court in dealing
with the exclusion of Negro voters from a Texas primary
election stated:
"It may now be taken .as a postulate that
the right to vote in such a primary for the nmnination of candidates without discrimination by
the State, like the right to vote in a general election, is a right secured by the Constitution.
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. at 314; Myers
v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368; Ex parte Yarbrough,
110 U.S. 651, 663 et seq. By the terms of the Fifteenth Amendment that right may not he abridged
by any State on account of race. Under our Con19
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stitution the great privilege of the ballot may not
be denied a man by the State because of his color."
(pp. 661-662)
See also Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) and
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) to the same effect.
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) to the contrary
was expressly overruled by Smith v. Allwright, supra.
In 1948, after the Arizona Supreme Court had decided Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. 2d 456
(1948) allowing Indians the right to vote in Arizona,
Chief Judge Orie L. Phillips, speaking for a three judge
Federal court eli1ninated what was then thought to be
the last discrilnination by any state in the Union against
Indians in exercising suffrage. In that case, Trujillo v.
Garley, unreported (printed as Appendix C hereto) the
question was whether the ~ ew l\1:exico Cmistitution provision excluding from franchise "Indians not taxed"
was invalid. Chief Judge Phillips stated:
"So, we think we should decide the question
of the constitutionality of the provision in the
New l\1:exico Constitution. It says that 'Indians
not taxed' 1uay not vote, although they possess
every other qualification. 'Ve are unable to escape
the conclusion that, under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, that constitutes a discrimination on the ground of race. Any other citizen,
regardless of race, in the State of Xew Mexico
who has not paid one cent of tax of any kind or
eharacter, if he possesses the other qualifications,
1na~y vote." (pp. 6-7)
~rhe court then "-ent on to analyze the contention
that the provision did not really 1nean Indians not taxed
but Indians that live in the pueblos in tribal relationship
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and held the distinction was not valid. Obviously referring to the previous Attorney General's rulings in Utah
on SeC'tion 20-2-14, allowing Indians the right to vote, the
court stated:
"We know that the other states who have had
similar requirements-Utah, one of the Dakot·as,
I am not sure about Colorado, I know it has su~h
a requirement-most of the other states, if nnt
all, who have this requirement have .administratively determined that it was a requirement which
could not constitutionally be imposed by the state.
\Vhile such rulings are not controlling, they, perhaps, are entitled to consideration."9 (p. 8)
Following the criteria of the Supreme Court in Lane
v. Wilson, supra, and G-uinn v. United States, supra, i.e.
excluding .all verbiage and considering discrimination a:s
discrimination, whether it be simple-minded or sophisticated, the Utah statute boils down to this. No test bearing any relationship to voting knowledge or capaci·ty is
imposed. If a person resides on an Indian reservation
and has not previously established a residence elsewhere
in the state he is excluded from voting. Whom does this
apply to~ As administered it applies to (1) Indians
who were born on the reservations and have never resided elsewhere, and ( 2) Federal employees and their
families. The latter may retain voting privileges in their
home or domicile state and do not lose residence for voting purposes while in the Federal service. There is no
9
In ·an opinion dated January 26, 1938, the Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior analyzed similar provisions in the
laws of Idaho, New Mexico and Washington and determined that
they were invalid under the Fifteenth Amendment.
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reason why they should vnte in Utah elections. On the
other hand, if the Indians born on the reservation are to
gain the franchise they are required to give up their
native homeland, move away from their property, family
and belongings and establish a residence elsewhere in the
state. No other citizen or voter, other than an Indian,
is imposed upon by such an unfair and unpurposeful requirement. It bears no real shield to its racial discrinlination.
As a rnatter of fact, the r tah statute was not adopted
with .any purpose in mind of avoiding racial discrimination or ereating equal treatment and classification for the
Indians. ..A.t the time it was passed, Indians were not
citizens and therefore ·were not entitled to vote. The
Federal District Court for Oregon had ruled in JicKay
v. Campbell, 16 Fed. Cas. 161 (1871) that Indians were
not citizens under the Constitution _and the Fourteenth
Amend1nent. The Suprerne Court in Elk v. Wilkins, 112
l~.S. 9-1 (188-1) held that an Indian who had left tribal
relations ·was not entitled to Yote in Xebraska, stating:
"The plaintiff, not being a citizen of the
United States under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution, has been deprived of no right
secured bY the Fifteenth Alnendluent, and cannot
rnaintain this .action." (p. 109)
As has previously been dernonstrated, not only has
the passage of ti1ne deYeloped as a rnatter of fact and
law that Indian n•servations in Utal1 ar:e within the state,
but the law has been changed so as to make Indians
citizens.
The self-executing provisions of the Fifteenth
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Amend1nent, the Supre1ne law of the land, have eradicated the conflicting provisions of Section 20-2-14 which
are no longer in effect. See Guinn v. United States,
supra. This was the concept of the Attorney General of
Washington in an opinion dated April 1, 1936 (Opinion
No. 4086 cited in the opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of Interior referred to in footnote 9), with respect to the Indian disfranchisement clause in the constitution of Washington:
"We are of the opinion, taking into consideration the 15th Amendment and the Act of June 2,
1924, that it is doubtful whether the provisions
of Article VI of the state constitution with respect
to Indians are now in effect."
As will be demonstrated in the following section,
there is no reasonable basis upon which discrimination
against Indians residing on reservations can be made.
All reasons have become ancient and .archaic and have
disappeared. The discrimination is one purely on the
basis of race or color and is invalid.
III. The Exclusion of Persons Residing on Indian
Reservations, Except Those Who Prior to Establishing Such
Residence Have Established a Residence Elsewhere in the
State of Utah, From the Classification of Residents for
Voting Purposes Constitutes Unreasonable and Discriminatory Classification Precluded by the Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Fourteenth An1endment provides in Section 1
thereof:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
23
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deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
There can be no doubt that the action of defendant
is state action, if par. 11, Section 20-2-14, is still valid.
He is authorized by statute to perform certain functions
as an election official of the state and in exercising those
functions purported to act in accordance with par. 11,
Section 20-2-1-±. The question, therefore, is whether the
statute, as applied and interpreted, denies plaintiff privileges and immunities of citizenship or equal protection of
the laws.
The Fourteenth Alnendment protects the fundamental rights of citizens. 'Vith respect to the importance
of suffrage, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Allwr·ight,
321 U.S. 649 (19-±-±) stated, at p. 66-±:
"The l~nited States is a constitutional demoCracy. Its organic law grants to all citizens a right
to participate in the choice of elected officials
without restriction by an~~ State because of race."
A full and cmnplete state1nent of this basic premise
of our :F,ederal constitutional republic is stated by the
Fourth Circuit in Rice Y. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (1947),
Cert. denied 333 U.S. 875 (1948), as follows:

"An essential feature of our form of government is the right of the citizen to participate in
the govern1nental process. The political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence is that
governn1ents deriYe their just powrers fron1 the
consent of the governed: and the right to a voice
in the selection of officers of government on the
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p.art of all citizens· is important, not only as a
means of insuring that gove,rnment shall have the
strength of popular support, but also as a means
of securing to the individual citizen proper consideration of his rights by those in power. The
disfranchis.ed can never speak with the same force
as those who are .able to vote. The Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments were written into the
Constitution to insure to the Negro, who had recently been liberated from slavery, the equal protection of the laws and the right to full participation in the process of government. These amendments have had the effe.ct of creating a fede:ral
basis of citizenship and of protecting the rights of
individuals and Ininorities from many abuses of
governmental power whi0h were not contemplated
at the time." (p. 392)
The Supreme Court of Arizona in Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. 2d 456 (1948) in upholding the
right of Indians in Arizona to vote stated:
"In a democracy suffrage is the most basic
civil right, since its exercise is the chief means
whereby other rights may be safeguarded. To
deny the right to vote, where one is legally entitled
to do so, is to do violence to the principles of
freedom and equality." (196 P. 2d 456, 459).
~Ir.

Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court in Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) stated with respect
to the Fourteenth Amendment:
"That Amendment 'not only gave citizenship
and the privileges of citizenship to persons of
color, but it denied to any State the power to
withhold from them the equal protection of the
laws .... '"
Of course, not only does the equal protection clause
25.:
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apply to Indians, as well as all persons within the juris
diction of a state, but the privileges and immunities
clause also applies to Indians. Deere v. State of New
York, 22 F. 2d 851 (1927).
While under the equal protection clause the States
may make classifications and could in the instant case
make classifications of persons entitled to vote, those
classifie;ations n1ust be based on some reasonable basis
and bear a relation to a lawful purpose. Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141 (1940); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
( 1886). Not only must classification be uniformly applied, but if a classification fair and reasonable on its
face is administered in an unequal and unfair manner
such action violates the ~-,ourteenth Amendment. Y ick
Wo v. Ilopkins, supra.
4

In the instant case the ruling of the Attorney General
of Utah, being applied to exclude plaintiff and others
similarly situated from suffrage reads in its "conclusion": "No facilities are necessary for Indians living on
reservations." In its final paragraph the ruling reads:
"Accordingly, Indians who live on the reservations are not entitled to Yote in rtah and a
Board of County Conunissioners has no duty to
provide then1 with voting facilities."
There is no mention of any other group or class,
except Indians. The ruling is addressed to the question
of Indians residing on re~ern1tions and is applied to
Indians alone. It is discrilninatory and so is the application of the statute.
The statute itself does not in1pose a reasonable and
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valid classification. There is no valid reason why Indians
residing on Indian reservations should be treated differently from those residing off the reservations. No test of
literacy, edu0ation, public interest or other £:actors relative to voting qualifications is made. There can be no
valid reason why Indians on reservations should be excluded from residents for voting purposes, any more than
residents of "Federal Heights" or ":Mill Creek" who
have not resided elsewhere in the state (including Indian
reservations) should be excluded. It is .axiomatic that
some of the leading college graduates residing on the
Uintah Indian Reservation, or land formerly within the
reservation, are perhaps more qualified to vote than
less educated and experienced citizens re,siding elsewhere
in the state.
As indieated by Attorney Gener.als Chez and Gile~s
in the opinion issued by them in 1940 (Appendix A), considerations which may have once prompted classification
of residents of Indian reservations differently from other
citizens of Utah have now evaporated with the passage of
time and the reversal of :B,eder.al Indian policy from that
of concentr:ating Indians on reservations to one of education and increasing economic security to enable the
Indian citizen to assume complete jurisdiction over his
own affairs and to participate fully in the ,activities of
the state in which he resides. 10
10 This statement of change of attitude by the Federal government is the substance of the policy stated in a letter dated July
21, 1948 from the ·Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
to the Department of Justice. Obviously this policy is a complete
change from that which pertained in 1897 when the Utah legi,s.lature passed par. 11, Section 20-2-14.
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Since the Utah legislature in 1897 passed the statute
now in question not only has the Indian obtained full
citizenship, but he has been invested with many other
rights and privileges to lessen his difference from his
white neighbor. The most recent federal action in this
direction was to provide for the termination of Federal
supervision over certain Indi·ans and Indian tribes in
Utah and other states.
The Act of August 27, 1954, 68 Stat. 868, provides
for a plan of termination of Federal supervision over
certain of the members of the Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation. Plaintiff is Vice-President of the non-profit Utah Corporation organized to
manage their affairs by the group of "mixed-bloods" as
to which supervision is in the process of being terminated.
The Act of September 1, 1954 ( 68 Stat. 1099) provided
for the termination of Federal supervision over the
property of the Shivwit, Kanosh, Koosharem and Indian
Peaks Bands of the Paiute Indian Tribe in Utah. These
termination bills conten1plate that the states will assume
further and complete govern1nental responsibility for
such s~ervices as education, law enforce1nent, agricultural .assistance to the Indians concerned and other
functions will be transferred to agencies of the state
or local governn1ent in the same 1nanner as they are
provided nonnally for other citizens.
On August 15, 1953 the President signed three acts
designed to further reduce the setting apart of Indians.
Public Law '277, 67 Stat. 586, renloYed discrinrinations
with respect to purchase of liquor by Indians. Public
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Law 280, G7 Stat. 588, provided for the conferring of full
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations
in five states and provided means for extending the act
to other st1ates. Public Law 281, 67 Stat. 590, ended a
long-standing discrimination ag.ainst Indians with respect
to personal property and loans on cattle they own.
The denial of the franchise to the Indians residing
on Indian reseTvations who have nnt established a residence elsewhere in the State of Utah prior to establishing residence on the reserv:ation cannot be justified on
any ground which is not discriminatory on account of
race or color or does not constitute unre1asonable and
unequal classification or treatment of citizens of the same
class and characteristics.
A. Arguments Often Advanced As Affording A
Basis For A Distinction As To Indians Do Not
Constitute A Valid Basis For Separate Classification For Voting Purposes.
1. Indian reservations are not exterritorial to a
state and persons of the same class within a state must
be treated alike. We have heretofore analyzed the decisions and the legislative and factual considerations
demonstrating that persons residing on Indian reservations are in fact and in law within the State of Utah.
United States v. McBratney) 104 U.S. 621; New York ex
rel. Ray v. Martin) 326 U. S. 496 (1946); pp. 10-15, supra.
A number of leading cases have held that once it is established that Indians are resident~s of a state and citizens thereof, they are entitled to vote as such and .any
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classification which excludes Indian citizens for voting
purposes because of residence on a reservation is invalid.
Trujillo v. Garley (D.C.N .M., unreported, Appendix C
hereto); Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 Pac. 2d
456 (1948); Swift v. Leach, 178 N.W. 437 (N.D., 1920);
State v. Norris, 37 Neb. 299,55 N.W.1086 (1893).
2. Reservation Indians are not exempt from state

jurisdiction exercised ,within constitutional limits. Indians residing on reservations in Utah are clearly not
exempt from operation of state law. When a reservation
Indian is away from the reservation, he is subject to
state law in exactly the same way as is any other citizen.
SrP Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, p. 119,
fn. 3-1. Congress has repealed the bulk of those ancient
federal statutes which draw a distinction between the
statu:-; of Indian citizens and other persons outside of
a resen:ration. See, for example, Public Law 277, 83d
Cong., approved August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 586), making
inapplicable to any area that is not "Indian Country,"
1.~ r.f'.C. § 115-l-. 1156. 3113, 348S and 3618, the so-called
lndian liquor laws~ Public Law 2Sl, 83d Cong., approved
.\ugu:-:t 15, 1n:-1:1 ((il ~tat. 590), repealinglawswhichprollihit purc·ha:-;p:-; from Indians of hunting articles, cooking
utf'n:-:il:-; and clothin~ and t11e sale to Indians of arms
nwi ammunition, and modifying the laws prohibiting the
.--:tiP or n<'qniring loans on livestork purchased for Indians
h~· the United States, 25 lT.S.C. § 195, 265, 266; 18 U.S. C.
§11[)1.
'Y"ith tl1e Pxception of tl1e so-called ten major crimes
pnni~h:tldt> h~· fc>(h'rnl la"· (Aet. of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat.
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683, 827; 18 U.S. C. § 1153) and other crimes by Indians
against Indians which might be tried in tribal courts,
for example, all offenses committed on Indian reservations either by Indi:ans or by non-Indians are punishable in the federal courts under state statute's. Act of
June 28, 1948, S1tpra, 18 U.S.C. §§ 13, 1152. United States
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). State taxing power
has been extended to Indian reservations. See the Act
of May 28, 1924 (43 Stat. 244, 25 U.S. C. § 398); Act of
l\{arch 3, 1927 (44 Stat. 1347). See, also, Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943).
3. Indians are sui juris. Plaintiff and other Indians
are permitted to sue like other citizens in state and
federal courts. Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 332 (1892).
They may execute contracts. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, pp. 164-166. See Harrison v. Laveen,
67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. (2d) 456 (1948), for a complete disposition of the argument that Indians are not sui juris.
4. Indians are not persons under guardianship.
Efforts have been made to exclude Indians from voting
on the grounds that they are persons under guardianship
or that they are wards. This argument is not valid.
Harrison v. Laveen, s1tpra, overruling Porter v. Hall,
34 Ariz. 308, 271 Pac. 411 (1928). The word "ward" is
used in many senses but in connection with Indians it
has no connotation of incapacity as to property which
they themselves own. Cohen's Handbook of Federal
Indian Law, pp. 169-173; Harrison v. Laveen, supra.
It may be helpful here to correct certain common
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impressions with respect to Indians living on reservations.
(.a) Despite widespread opinions to the contrary, Indians are not confined to reservations and no
official has custody of the persons residing on Indian
reservations. While in years past there was a practice,
unauthorized by statute, of requiring the issuance of a
pass to Indians desiring to leave the reservation, this
practice has long been obsolete. Cohen's Handbook of
Federal Indian Law, pp. 176-177. Today Indians need
no pennission to leave a reservation and travel to and
from the reservation just as any other citizens travel
to and from their own farn1s or homes. As a matter of
fact, with the allotment and opening of the Utah reservatron upon which plaintiff resides, the identity of the
reservation as such has, for practical purposes, been
destroyed.
(b) Not only does no federal official have the
right to the custody of the person of an Indian, but an
Indian is entitled to habeas corpus if any federal official
seeks to detain him without a warrant. United States ex
rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 Fed. Cas. X o. 14891, C.C.
Nebr. (1879).

5. Indians are not incompetent persons. "While it
is sometimes said that certain reservation Indians have
not received "certificates of emnpetency," this term is
a word of .art having to do with the status of his property
and not of his person. A reseiTation Indian n1ay handle
his own affairs. He does not have to obtain permission
or consult any governmental or tribal official as to where
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he shall live, what en1ployment he shall seek .and perform,
whom he shall marry or as to other matters, the decision
as to which is ordinarily reserved for competent persons.
He has been subjected to military service equally with
other citizens. Totus v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 7
(D.C. Wash., 1941). It is common knowledge that many
Indians, including those entering the military service
directly from Indian reservations, have served their
country with distinction in recent conflicts. They are
entitled to GI loans and benefits and many Indians
whose resideces are on reservations in Utah are attending
leading educational institutions .and establishing outstanding records. Many Indians hold le·ading public
positions of responsibility, one being the Chief Justice
of the Supre1ne Court of Oklahoma.
6. Indians residing on reservations require representation by officials in whose election they have a voice.
Almost every session of Congress enacts legislation of
fundamental importance to Indians as a group. This
special legislation governs the lives and property of
Indians on reservations. In addition, Indians generally
are subjected to the same laws as other citizens. One
of the fundament,al concepts of our constitutional democracy, with its republican form of government, is th.at all
citizens should have an opportunity of lending their
voice to the selection of those who will represent them
in enacting the laws of the land. Upon this basic concept
is founded the slogan "Taxation without representation
is tyranny." Because of the status and unique historical
background of Indians and their special relationship to
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federal and state governments, legislation and administrative action as to them has become more intimate and
complicated perhaps than that applicable to any other
group of citizens. For this reason it is possibly more
important that Indians be given an opportunity to join
in the selection of lawmakers and officials than it is
that any other group be given the opportunity.
The foregoing background places in bold relief the
question: "On what reasonable basis may Indians residing on Indian Reservations become a separate class
for exclusion from voting privilege~s ~" Why does the
Utah strutute exclude only residents of Indian ·and military reservations, yet rernain silent as to all other kinds
of reserv;ations and withdrawals, such as game sanctuaries, bird refuges, reclamation withdrawals and reserves, national forests, stock driveways, federal power
withdrawals and other such areas. The simple reason is
that the legislature desired in 1897, when it was constitutional to do so, to exclude (1) soldiers and (2) Indians. Soldiers could lawfully be excluded, then and now.
They do not est,ablish a residence in Utah, since they are
not residing on military reservations in the usual sense
of establishing residence. The general rule as to soldiers
is stated in 18 Arn. Jur. at p. 224 as follows:
" ... it is the general rule that a soldier or
sailor does not gain a voting residence in a particular place by reason of his 1nere presence there
while in the perfonnance of his duty. Conversely,
a soldier or sailor does not lose his residence for
voting purposes on account of his employment,
even though he uuty, during his period of service,
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change his residence, where his intention to retain
his original residence is sufficiently shown."
The same rule applies to persons in government
service. 18 Am. Jur. p. 223.
The Indian under the operation of the Utah st~atute
does not have the privilege of ballot guaranteed to military men. He must move off the reservation, leave his
home and property to qualify. This is an unreasonable,
unequal .and unconstitutional classification.
B. The Supreme Court of the United States in the
Past Twenty-Five Years Has Given Broad Interpre,tation to the Protection Afforded By the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In recent years, not only has the Supreme Court
given extensive consideration to the validity of exclusions of persons from voting, see pp. 17-21, supra, but
it has been liberal in interpreting guaranties provided in
the Fourteenth Amendment. InBuchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60 (1917), it held that no state may prohibit
any person from occupying a residence in a particular
area or c1ass of areas. In Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), it
has been held that the Fourteenth Amendment even
precludes the enforcement of restrictive racial covenants
and agreements with respect to property. Both state
and federal courts have held that state laws denying
Indians or other racial minorities the same privileges
to hunt or fish that are enjoyed by other re~sidents of
the state are directly in violation of the United States
Constitution. See, e.g., Takahasni v. Fish and Game
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Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). In Bradley v. Arizona
Corp. Comm., ?O Ariz. 508, 141 P~ac. 2d 524 (1943), the
St:ipreme -Court of Arizona upheld the constitutional right
of.an Indian to sue to obtain a certificate of convenience
or necessity for the operation of a motor vehicle as a
contract carrier. The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia ruled in State of Arizona v.
Hobby, (D.C. D.C., March 3, 1953, unreported) that a
state may not constitutionally bar persons of Indi:an
blood residing on Indian reservations from participating
in Social Security benefits administered by the state.
Finally, in the field of public education, the- ~Supreme
Court has extended the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibitingthe states and the District of Columbia from maintail)ing racially segregated public schools.
Brown v. BoCJ;rd of_ Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See also 111 issouri·
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipnel v.
Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950); illcLawriJ~ v. Oklalzoma State Regents,
3·39 u.s. 637-(1950).
IV. If Par. 11, Sec.· 20·2-1-l, is Valid as Applied To
Deny Indians Residing Within The Former Uintali Iridian
Reservation The Right to Vote, -Equal Protection and Ap~.
plication Of The. Law Requires T_hat White._ Persons Residing Within The Former Reservation Also Be Excluded
From Voting.
··
··
. Th~ thrust of the interpretation of :Jiareh 23, 1956,
by the Attorney General of Utah is to deny Indians
residing on re~rlTntions and who have riever established
a rrHidenee elsewhere the Yoting facilities and the right
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to vote. There is nothing in the opinion of the Attorney
General or the .action of defendant to indicate that white
persons residing within the exterior limits of the Uintah
Indian Reservation established by Executive Order of
October 3, 1861, and the Act of :May 5, 1864, 13 Stat.
63, were equally with Indians, to be denied the right to
vote. As a matter of fact, it is admitted by defendant
that white persons residing on non-Indian land within
the former reservation are being allowed to register and
vote. ~lore than 500,000 acres of the Uintah Reservation
were sold at public auction in 1910, 1912 and 1917, and
were purchased by non-Indians. Large .additional areas
of land have been the subject of homesteads, mineral
locations, entries and patents. It is clearly established
federal law that even patented land within an Indian
Reservation remains part of the reservation. United
States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909). In Tooisgah
v. United States, 186 F. 2d 93 (1955), the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appe.als stated:
"Once reservation is established all tracts
included within it remain ,a part of the reservation
until separated therefrom by Congress." (p. 94)
As a matter of fact, even if classification ean be
sustained on the ground that the legislature may lawfully
exclude residents of one part of the state from suffrage
at the s.ame time it allows residents of another part of
the state to vote, it would be axiomatic that equal protection and application of the laws would preclude a
second discrimination within the classification, that of
allowing whites in that are.a to vote but denying Indians
in the same are:a a right to vote.
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Since under the Fourteenth Amendment the State
of Utah is required to grant equal protection of the laws
to all persons subject to its jurisdiction, the election
officials of Ut~ah must be required to trent whites and
Indians on the former Uintah Reservation alike.
Therefore, in the event this Court should fail to
grant the mandatory relief prayed for to guarantee
Indians residing on reservations in Utah a right to vote,
then a mandatory order should issue requiring the equal
application of the law by the denial of the right to white
persons simiLarly situated.
V. This Court Has Authority to Issue an Injunction
Or Other Equitable Relief to Protect Plaintiff's Political
Rights Guaranteed By The Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.

The rights asserted by plaintiff are fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. As demonstrated by the opinion of
Chief Judge Phillips, such rights are legitimately protected by injunction or other equitable remedies .and
this is so, even though the right protected is a political
right. Trujillo v. Garley (unreported, Appendix C).
In Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. ~d 387 (1947), cert. den.
333 U.S. 875 (1948), the Court concluded that the action
of state officials in a Denwcratic primary denied the
constitutional rights of a negro and that injunctive relief
was appropriate. It stated at p. 39~:
"There can be no question, therefore, as to
the jurisdiction of the court to grant injunctive
relief, whether the suit be Yiewed as one under
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the general provision of 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1) to
protect right1s guaranteed by the Constitution,
or under 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (11) to protect the
right of citizens of the United States to vote,
or under 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (14) to redress the
deprivation of civil rights."
CONCLUSION

Plaintiff and other American Indians residing on
Indian reserv,a;tions in Utah are citizens of the United
States and the state in which they reside. As such, they
are, under the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Utah, entitled to all the
rights, privileges and immunities of citizens. Since the
Utah legislature enacted paragraph 11, Sec. 20-2-14,
the Uint.ah Reservat~on has been opened for settlement
and has been allotted in part to individual Indians. Also,
since that time Congress has extended citizenship to
the Indians residing on reservations in Utah. Sec. 20-214, as construed and applied by defendant to exclude
from suffrage Indians residing on Indian reservations.
in Utah who have not established residence elsewhere
in the State of Utah prior to taking up residence on the
reservation, constitutes an unlawful discrimination on
account of race and color. Paragr.aph 11 so construed
and applied, constitutes unreasonable classification in
violation of the equal proteetion clause and the privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
By the self-executing provisions of the superior federal
law, the ],ourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, such
portions of par. 11 which direct such action, automatic-
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ally became inoperative because of their invalidity upon
the extension of citizenship in 1924 to all Indians born
in the U nrted States. The mandatory relief sought by
the plaintiff should be granted and the alternative writ
made permanent.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT W. BARKER
744 Jackson Place, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.
JOHN S. BOYDEN
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff

WILKINSON, CRAGUN,
BARKER & HAWKINS
744 Jackson Place, N. W.
Washington 6, D.C.
Counsel to National Congress
of American Indians
BOYDEN, TIBBALS,
STATEN & CROFT
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Of Counsel
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APPENDIX A
OFFICE O:b.., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY 14, UTAH
October 25, 1940
Mr. Sterling John Talbot
Whiterocks, Utah
Dear Reverend Talbot :
I am pleased to give you the folowing views relative
to my interpretation of the application of the provisions
of Subdivision (11), Section 25-2-14, Revised Statutes
of Utah, 1933, which reads:
"For the purpose of registration or voting
the place of residence of any person must be
governed by the following rules as far as they
are applicable:

*

* *

*

"(11) Any person living upon an Indian or
military reservation shall not be deemed a r.esident of Utah within the meaning of thi'S chapter
unless such person had acquired a residence upon
such Indi~an or military reservation."
You are interested to know whether the foregoing
statute longer applies to the Uintah Indian Reservation
in Utah since the unallotted lands of that Reservation
by an Act of Congress of the United States, approved
May 27, 1902, (32 Stat. 263) were restored to the public
domain, and since by a proclamation of the President
of the United States, dated July 14, 1905, such lands
were declared open to entry. The lands so restored to
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entry have largely passed into private ownership both
among -the white and Indian settlers. Registration and
voting districts have since been estabHshed thereon,
and the occupants of those lands have vot~d, so I am
informed, within such voting precinct as late as 1928
when the provisions of the foregoing statute wer~ called
to their attention and the exercise of the franchise within that locality challenged. I understand that with the
recurrence of each election this matter has been a serious
bone of contention among the people in Uintah County.
After an ·extended study of this problem I am of
the opinion that the statute in question cont~mplated a
clO'sed reservation. :.Moreover, the changed conditions in
the locality in question with reference to the attitude
taken toward the occupants of the lands in question by
both State and county public authorities in the assessment, levying, and collection of taxe·s, together with the
general jurisdiction assumed by State and county public
officials over the affairs of the citizens residing upon
the domain within the reservation, indicat~s clearly the
inapplicability of the statute in question. Prior to the
time when the unallotted lands within the reservation
were declared open to entry, the Federal Government
exercised exclusive jurisdiction, and access to the reserv.ation was forbidden except by military pass. As stated
above, since the unallotted lands were thrown open to
entry, voting precinct·s have been established and State,
county and school tax:es have been levied and collected
as well as inemne, cigarette, n1otor car and ~ales taxes
from thoRe residing upon the open reservation.
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It will be noted the statute refers to residence in
some county in Utah, not sonw other county. Therefore,
when the reservation was thrown open to homestead
settlers it is entirely reasonable to assume that the
reason for segregating that territory from Uintah County
for ele~ction purposes no longer persisted. Then, too,
it must be observed that the attitude of the Government
towards the Indians then1selves with relation to voting
privileges has changed materially since the Utah statute
in que~stion was enacted. By Federal Act approved June
2, 1924, all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial
limits of the United States are declared to be citizens
of the United States. The Act further provides that the
granting of citizenship shall not in any manner impair
or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to trib.al or
other property. (U.S. Stat. at Large, Vol. 43, p. 253)
Under Amendment XV to the Federal Constitution,
Section 1, the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Under the Federal Constitution, the Acts of Congress and the Constitution .and laws of this State, therefore, I am of the opinion that the Indians themselves
residing upon the Uintah Reservation who are of the age
of twenty-one years, and who are otherwise eligible under
l;tah law, are eligible to vote within the precinct within
which they are residing though such precinct may be
within the territorial boundaries of the Uintah Reservation.
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If I am correct in this conclus1on there would seem
to be no rhyme or reason in applying the provisions of
subdivision (11), supra, to persons other than Indians
residing upon the Uintah Reservation.
It is, however, in the final analysis a matter which
is of sufficient importance to warrant the earnest consideration of the next Legislature, and if there is doubt
of the correctness of my conclusions, the remedy lies
with the Legislature. Certain I am that the changed
conditions and circumstances, together with recent enactments of Congress regarding voting privileges of Indians themselves, calls for further attention of ,the
Legislature to the statute question. Meantime I am
clearly of the opinion that the doubt should be resolved
in f'RV'Or of granting the franchise to the citizens residing in the Uintah Reservation rather than denying
the 'same.
Kindest personal regards.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Gover A. Giles
Assistant ~~ttorney General ·
Approved:
jsj Joseph A. Chez
Attorney General
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APPENDIX B
March 23, 1956
Secretary of State
Building
REQUESTED BY: Hon. Lamont F. Toronto, Secretary of State
OPINION BY:
E. R. Callister, Attorney General
K. Roger Bean, Assistant Attorney
General
QUESTION:
'\tVho has the re sponsibility of providing voting facilities for Indians~
CONCLUSION:
No f.acilities are necessary for Indians living on reservations.
Indians who are born in the United States are citizens of the United States. 8 U.S.C.A., Section 1401. As
such, they are entitled to the ·same voting privileges as
other citizens. Constitution of Utah, Article IV, Section
2. But like other citizens, they must establish a voting
residence in Utah in accordance with the terms of Section 20-2-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Paragraph 11
of that section provides as follows:
1

"(11) Any person living upon any Indian or military reservation shall not be deemed a resident
of Utah within the meaning of this chapter, unless
such person had acquired a residence in some
county in Utah prior to taking up his residence.
upon such Indian or military reservation."
Accordingly, Indians who live on the reservations
are not entitled to vote in Utah and a Board of County
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Commissioners has no duty to provide them with voting
facilitiers. Indians living off the reservation may, of
course, register and vote in the voting district in which
they reside, the same as any other citizen.
Yours very truly,

E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
ERC:gq
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APPENDIX C
ABSTRACT OF REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF
UNREPORTED OPINION OF THREE-JUDGE FEDERAL COURT IN NEvV l\1EXICO VOTING CASE,
TRUJILLO V. GARLEY
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
MIGUEL H. TRUJILLO,
Plaintiff

vs.
ELOY GARLEY, as County Clerk
and ex officio County Recorder of
Valencia County, New Mexico,
Defendant.

No. 1353

JUDGE PHILLIPS orally delivered the opinion of
the Court.
Now, this matter comes before the Court at this
time on an application for a preliminary injunction, mandatory in character, which would restr.ain the registration officials, the County Clerk, from refusing to register
the plaintiff as a qualified elector in his precinct, and
all other persons similarly situated with the plaintiff.
The right was denied by the county official, the County
Clerk, on the ground that the plaintiff was .an "Indian
not taxed," and that notwithstanding that he had paid
excise taxes, and denial of the, right to register being
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based upon the fact that he had not paid ad valorem
taxes on real or personal property.
The Constitutional provision in question is Section
1 of Article 7 of the Constitution of the State of New
Mexico, which provides that every male citizen of the
United States who is over the age of twenty-one years
and has resided in New Mexico twelve months, in the
county ninety days, and in the precinct in which he offers
to vote thirty days, next preceding the election, except
idiots, insane persons, persons convicted of a felonious
or infamous crime, unless restored to political rights,
and then comes the provision here n1aterial, and "Indians
not taxed," shall be qualified to vote at all elections for
public officers.
In disposing of the application for a preliminary
injunction, the Court will find the facts specifically as
they are set forth in the stipulation of the parties.
Three preliminary questions are raised. One is that
the plaintiff here asserts a political right, and that courts
of equity should not grant redress for protection of what
are regarded as political rights in the strict sense of
that term, and that the plaintiff's remedy is an action
at law. The right asserted here is a right guaranteed
by the :B,ourteenth and Fifteenth A1nendments to the
Con~titution of the Pnited States, and implemented by,
statutory provisions. The Act of April 20, 1871, the
part now found in 8 U.S.C.A. in Section 43, says that
every person who under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, eust:mn or usage of any state or territory
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subject~ or caused to be ~ubjected any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall
be liable to the p.arty injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding of redress. Under
the statute, and the more recent adjudications~and particularly the case of Rice v. Elmore, decided by the
Fourth Circuit and reported in 165 Federal 2d, 387, and
other kindred cases-we think injunction is an appropriate remedy for the redress of the claim or right here
a'Sserted.
The second is that the Indian pueblos are not a part
of the State of New :Mexico. The United States does
not exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the pueblo Indian areas. For certain purposes, they are within the
jurisdiction of the State of New Mexico. We think they
are a part of it. In this conection, see United States v.
~[cBratney, 104 U.S. 621.
The final preliminary question is whether this Court
should at this time undertake to decide the constitutional
question involived, for the .asserted reasons that it involves a construction of the phrase "Indians not taxed"
which had not yet been authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Court of New :Mexico; that this Court should
not indulge in academic constructions of the state statutes
for the purpose of determining constitutional questions,
but should relegate the parties to an action in the state
court where the meaning of the phrase involved will be
determined hy the state court; and that the constitutional
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issue, if any remains, will be clear cut. It is well settled
that the Federal courts should avoid the determination
of constitutional questions where construction of state
statutes or state laws are involved and should wait until
there has been an authoritative determination of the
meaning of the state law by the state courts before the
constitutional question is determined. Accordingly, it
has been held many times that if, under one construction
of a state statute or constitutional provision, the constitutionality of the law would be clear, wheras under
another construction the law would be unconstitutional,
the Federal court should not undertake a construction
in advance of the determination by the state Supreme
Court. And it has also been held that such .a course
should be followed if under a given construction the constitutional question would disappear from the case.
Those principles are laid down in Spector Motor
Service v. 1\IcLaughlin, Tax Commissioner, 323 U.S. 101,
the l\1:eridith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228.
In the instant case the plaintiff is confronted with
this situation, that the administrative authorities construed this constitutional provision to prohibit ~ from
voting unless he has paid ad valorem taxes oit real or
personal property. That construction is son1ewhat indicated, if not clearly held, in the recent decision of the
Supreme Court of New ~Iexico in Tapia v. Lucero, No.
5082, decided July 13, 1948, wherein the court said: "On
the new trial, in view of what \Ye have said, the unsatisfactory state of the proof on the ilnportant issue whether
the plaintiff aiHl other 1ne1nbers of the pueblo Indian
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tribes pay ad valoren1 taxes, no doubt will be clarified
and settled by a specific finding." Moreover, unless this
question is determined, if the plaintiff is right in his
contentions, he would be deprived of his right to vote
at the coming election. Furthermore, this is a civil rights
case. \Ve are of the opinion that, under the more recent
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the
duty and right of the Federal courts to protect the citizen in the assertion of his civil rights is clearly indicated.
Ordinarily, a Federal court does not, in a case where it
had jurisdiction, step aside because a question of state
la\v is involved at the threshold of the determination of
the case. The exceptional cases where the court does
that are as pointed out by the late Chief Justice Stone
in :Meridith v. Winter IIaven, and of course in that category of exceptions are the constitutional question cases.
But there is no indication now that .a speedy decision can
be had in the courts of New l\1:exico. And it is obvious
to us, unless we decide this question, this plaintiff and
others similarly situated will be deprived of the right
to vote at the coming national election.
Of course, we are determining this case on the status
of the present civil rights as set forth in the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution,
and in the statutes enacted complementary thereto.
Now, with respect to deciding this constitutional
question, perhaps this further observation should be
made. As we view the provision of the New Mexico Constitution, it is immaterial whether or not from a constitutional standpoint "Indians not taxed" means Indians
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who do not pay ad valorem tax or means Indians who
do not pay state taxes of any character. It might be
true-and I think we must admit-that if the state
Supreme Court should ultimately hold that the payment
of a tax on one purchase of gasoline or on one suck of
flour would qualify the Indian to vote, that the constitutional question so far as this plaintiff is concerned
would disappear. But the practical situation is that the
statute is being construed otherwise, and this Indian is
being deprived of the right to vote, if he has the right
to vote, by the limited construction. So,- we think we
should decide the question of the constitutionality of
the provision in the New Mexico Constitution. It says
that "Indians not taxed" niay not vote, although they
possess every other qualification. We are unable to
escape the conclusion that, under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, that constitutes a discrimination
on the ground of race. Any other citizen, regardless of
race, in the Sta,te of New Mexico who has not paid one
cent of t~ax of any kind or character, if he possesses the
other qualifications, may vote. An Indian, and only
an Indian, in order to n1eet the qualifications of a voter,
must have paid a tax. How you can escape the conclusion
that that makes a requirement with respect to an Indian
as a qualification to exercise the elective franchise ,and
does not make that require1nent \Yith respect to the member of any other rare is beyond n1e. I just feel like the
conclusion is inescapable.
Now, the suggestion \Yas made that they really
don't n1ean Indians not taxed, but they 111e.an Indians
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that live in pueblos in tribal relationships, and who are
favored by the Federal requirements that their land and
personal property is free from taxation by the State.
The fact remains that the constitutional p:vovisions say
that each citizen who possesse'S these other qualifications
may vote unless he is an Indian. If he is an· Indian, it
says he may not vote if he has not paid a tax. We don't
think the distinction which the able argument of the
Assistant District Attorney has presented does justify
us in concluding that this is not a discrimination on the
ground of race.
It, perhaps, is not entirely pe-rtinent to the issue,
but we know how these New 1Iexico pueblo Indians and
non-pueblo Indians in the state have re'Sponded to the
need of the country in time of war in a patriotic wholehearted way, both in furnishing manpower in the military
forces and in the purchase of war bonds and patriotic
contributions of that character. We know that the other
states who have had similar requirements-Utah, one
of the Dakotas, I am not sure about Colorado, I know
it has such a requirement--most of the other states, if
not all, who have this requirement have ·administratively
dete-rmined that it was a requirement which could not
constitutionally be imposed by the state. While such
rulings are not controlling, they, perhaps, are entitled
to consideration.
Why should an Indian, who answers his country's
call like these Indians have, be deprived of the right to
vote beeause he appears to be favored by a requirement
of the National Government~ That' is, certain property
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shall be exeinpted from taxation. I don't know whether it
is still on the statute books, but when I was in the Legislruture, back in 1921, we passed a statute giving an exserviceman an exemption of two thousand dollars from
taxation. There was a special class that enjoyed a particular tax exemption. Would it have been constitutional
for New Mexico to have then said this class that enjoys
the two thousand dollar tax exemption shall not be permitted to vote~ And especially if they had said they
may not vote if they are Swedes or Norwegians or Germans. I just don't think, and my brothers agree with me,
that this constitutional provision can be sustained in the
face of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and
we so conclude.
Perhaps Judge S.avage and Judge Broaddus would
like to amplify what I have said.
JUDGE BROADDUS: I have nothing.
JUDGE SAVAGE: You have very well stated my
views, Judge Phillips. I might add this. There has never
been any question in Iny mind as to the unconstitutionality of the constitutional provision. I have been troubled
by the cases to which Judge Phillips referred indicating
that under certain circu1nstances the Federal court should
stand by and ·wait for an authoritative construction of
the state statute or state constitutional provision. But
I am convinced that the Federal court should not stand
by and await the outc01ne of .an action to be instituted in
the state court when the practical result would necessarily be to deprive a eertain class of citizens of their con54
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stitutional right to vote at the next election. Certainly,
that would be the practical result here should we defer
decision in this case until an action could be commenced
and prosecuted through the state courts of New Mexico.
JUDGE BROADDUS: Of course, the Court is in
hannony in interpreting these statutes; the civil rights
statutes, and Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
with the natural rights of men and their civil rights and
responsibilities. The thought occurs to me, as we have
discussed and as you may properly direct to the attention
of counsel, that this matter may be disposed of as a
final matter.
JUDGE PHILLIPS: Perhaps I should have stated
this Court's jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C.A.
Section 21, subdivision 1, and subdivision 12 and subdivision 14. Now, having indicated our views, it would
seem that every relevant issue of fact and law is presented. There seems to be no good reason why it
shouldn't be agreed by counsel that the Court enter a
final judgment at this time on the Complaint, and the
facts as reflected in the stipulation. I don't see how
there can be any additional facts pertinent, .and what
we have said disposes of the real merits of the controversy. Another important reason for that is this: That
the state could immediately appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States. Of course, you could appeal fron1
the order granting an interlocutory injunction. But,
if we made a final disposition and entered a final order,
you could appeal front that and the Supreme Court
could then, if it was so minded, advance the case .and hear
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it on the lOth of October, which would be the second
Monday, tenth or eleventh, I am not sure which, the time
when the Court usually begins to hear cases. They meet
on the first l\Ionday and I think start hearings on the
second Monday. There would . be a strong possibility
that you could get a final decision by the Supreme Court
of the United States in October so that you would know
when the election came whether to permit these people
to vote or not. Of course, you would have to register
them in the meantime. But whether or not you would
count their votes could, I should think, possibly be determined by the election in K oven1ber. That is the speediest way to get a de,tennination of this question that I
can see.
Is there any objection to a final determination?
MR. FEDERICI: No objection on the part of the
State. I think that is a good suggestion and we will concur in it. We want a speedy determination.
JUDGE PHILLIPS: Let counsel add to the stipulation they have already n1ade that this is sub1nitted for
a final and permanent injunction, and the Court will
enter a declaratory judgment that that portion of the
New Mexico Constitutional provision ··Indians not taxed"
contravenes the ~.,ourteenth and Fifteenth Alnendments
and is void, and will enjoin the County Clerk of Yalencia
County from refusing to register the plaintiff as a qualified voter, and frmn refusing to register the other Indi,ans ~imilarly situated in his county who are qualified
voters other than the f.act that they have not paid the
taxes.
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